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THE OPTIMAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE SIMPLEST MODEL 
1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
In the last five years humanity has become faced with the problem of the optimal socio- 
economic order more clearly than ever. After the confrontation of capitalism and 
socialism, which was the core of the Marxist thesis, the fact transpired that capitalism 
was not the optimal order. It was eliminated in two different ways. 
In Western economies capitalism was reformed stepwise by pulling its sharpest teeth, 
while maintaining the stimulating forces in the markets. As to communist economies - 
the Soviet Union changed capitalism via the 1917 October evolution and China fol- 
lowed. In 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev's view that the communist system did not work was 
accepted by the Soviet Union communist party congress. Now, in 1992, the world is 
discussing, more urgently than ever, what the best ('optimal') socio-economic order is; 
how much reintroduction of capitalism is necessary to attain the best order? 
This essay discusses the simplest possible model that can contribute to the discussion. 
The advantage of building the simplest possible model is twofold. Firstly, such a model 
can state the nature or essence of an optimal order. Secondly, it can indicate the order 
of  magnitude of the main characteristic of an optimal order. The main characteristic - 
the question that separated socialists from other politicians - is the redistribution of in- 
come. Within a single nation, redistribution is achieved by taxes and social security con- 
tributions. In the world economy, redistribution is accomplished by development 
assistance and trade policy. In this essay the language used is that of the industrial 
economy, in which the two groups considered are labour and capital. The model can be 
translated into another in which the two groups are the developed and underdeveloped 
countries. It may even be translated into a security model of two powers, in which 
redistribution is obtained by security assistance (see J. Tinbergen, World Security and 
Equity, Aldershot, 1990), or a colonial system. In the last version not the common 
welfare will be maximized, but the welfare of the colonial powers, which leads to 
negative redistribution (the exploitation of the colonies). 
2 THE NORMAL OPTIMIZATION PROCEDURE AND A PARTIAL APPROACH 
To find the solution to this optimality problem the following steps are made. Firstly, a 
list of all the variables occurring in the welfare function is drawn up. Then, welfare is 
expressed in terms of these variables. The third step is to draw up a list of the restrictions 
that are imposed by environment, technology and logic. The restrictions are presented 
in such a way that their mathematical expression must be zero. These expressions are 
multiplied by a so-called Lagrange multiplier and added to the welfare function. The 
sum is called the maximand. Since each restriction equals zero, the maximand remains 
equal to the welfare expression. 
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The conditions to be fulfilled to maximize welfare are reproduced by equations ex- 
pressing that the first derivatives of the maximand with regard to each variable are equal 
to zero. We now have as unknowns the variables and the Lagrange multipliers. As equa- 
tions we have the restrictions, equal in number to the Lagrange multipliers, and the con- 
ditions, which are equal in number to the variables. So there are as many equations as 
there are unknowns. This normally ensures that the problem can be solved. 
3 SOLVING THE PARTIAL PROBLEM 
The complete solution of our problem is rather complicated, especially because of the 
production function in it. But we can only use that part of the system of equations profi- 
tably in which the variables appear that concern us most. These variables are z~, the per 
capita income transfer received by group 1, the underdeveloped countries or the 
workers, and z2, the amount per capita paid by the developed countries or the capital 
owners. In our concrete illustration which features two types of countries, the actual per 
capita incomes y~ and Y2 for 1988 are $320 and $17,080, respectively. The respective 
population sizes aj and a2 were 2,884 and 787 million, respectively. Of the two equa- 
tions we have chosen, one expresses the essence of the optimum, which is the situation 
in which per capita incomes are equal: 
Yl q-~,l- Y2--Z2. (1) 
The other refers to the restrictions, namely 
al zl - a2z2. (2) 
Since for 1988, al, a2, ..Vl and Y2 are given, we are able to calculate z~ and z2 as 3,582.3 
and 13,177.8, respectively. From the figures, we can derive that in the static equilibrium 
representing the solution, that is, by the end of the development process, 77.15 per cent 
of the per capita income of today's group 2 will have to be transferred to group 1, that 
is to say, from the 'prosperous' to the 'poor'  countries - or, from capital to labour. 
In section 4 we shall discuss the possible development towards those aims and the time 
it takes to attain them. 
4 HOW TO ATTAIN THE AIMS; ACCELERATING DEVELOPMENT 
In 1988 the ratio of incomes per capita of underdeveloped to developed countries was 
320/17,080 =0.0187, less than 2 per cent. However, the per capita income of developing 
countries is rising faster than that of developed nations, for the 1965-1988 period a 
yearly average of 0.782 per cent more. Should growth continue the way it has, the aim 
of income equality would almost ake five centur ies  to achieve. It is doubtful that Latin 
Americans, Asians and Africans would be that patient. So we should investigate how 
the development process can be accelerated. One way is to raise the development 
assistance of developed to underdeveloped nations. How to reduce five centuries of 
waiting to one can be computed from the formula 
1,0078100(yl +;21 Z2 ) Y2 Z2- (3) 
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From this formula we find Z2/Y2 = 0.602, or a development assistance of 60.2 per cent, 
almost 175 times the current 0.35 per cent. To stretch their patience to 400 years would 
still require 8.1 per cent assistance. 
The new variable in our analysis is the length o f  the period chosen or imposed to at- 
tain the optimal income redistribution. A complete theory should explain the choice of 
the period; I have no such theory. Yet, some comparisons with observed values of 
redistribution will suggest directions for further esearch. That alone seems to make this 
study worth presenting even in its incomplete form. To complete the theoretical part, I 
will give a few remarks on the measurement of welfare as a verification of the results ob- 
tained. 
5 THE MEASUREMENT OF WELFARE 
Economists do not agree on the possibility of measuring welfare, a concept also in- 
dicated by the words satisfaction, happiness, utility or ophelimity. For that reason I am 
discussing the subject in this last section of the theoretical part of this address. I belong 
to the group of economists who think welfare can be measured. In The Netherlands, 
Professor B.M.S. van Praag and his students have mesasured the welfare of various 
groups in Belgium, The Netherlands and elsewhere. They have also investigated which 
of the various mathematical functions give the best approximation of the figures obtain- 
ed. The best fit is provided by the logarithm of the determinant of welfare. No alter- 
native method has been proposed: this explains my choice. Since in this essay incomes 
are the determinants, the expression yielding welfare (1) in the initial situation is: 
Io = a~o ln Ylo + a20 [rl Y2o = 24,276.4. 
For the optimum situation we obtain: 
lont = (2884 + 784) In 3902.3 = 30, 331.9. 
To check whether this is really a maximum, we calculated l for two cases where a little 
less and a little more assistance is given, namely z2 = 0.75Y2 and z2 = 0.80y 2. We get: 
/0.75 = 30,327.3, /o.8o=30,323.6 
Both values are lower than the optimal value and situated between the initial and the op- 
timal value. So 0.77 of Y2 is optimum. 
6 SOME EMPIRICAL FIGURES ON INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 
Two sets of figures about redistribution of incomes are available. One refers to income 
redistribution within nations and the other to redistribution among countries. The 
former figures were published in the World Labour Report 1984 (pp. 210-213) by the 
International Labour Office in Geneva. They refer to the redistribution through social 
security schemes and so represent a minimum: there may be additional private schemes. 
The latter are published annually by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), of which I 
have chosen the 1987 Report. 
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According to the 1984 figures, redistribution within nations varies from 0.2 per cent 
(Rwanda) and 29.9 per cent (Sweden) of gross national product. For developed coun- 
tries the percentages vary from 10 (Japan) to 29.9. Our interpretation is that 'impatient' 
countries want redistribution to be completed in seven to eight generations, whereas the 
governments of the least developed countries believe that their populations are prepared 
to wait until the 18th generation. This seems highly unlikely and my comment is that 
such cruelty must not be accepted. One requirement for development assistance, 
alongside some other human rights, should be a higher percentage of redistribution 
through social security schemes. Alternatively, the governments of poor countries 
should, by tax policies, see to it that high incomes are spent on investments to a suffi- 
cient degree. In other words, rich citizens of underdeveloped countries hould con- 
tribute more to the development of their countries. (As will he shown later, greater 
contributions bythe citizens of the developed countries are also, and in fact much more, 
needed.) 
The development assistance provided by developed nations amounts to 0.35 per cent 
of their gross domestic product (GDP), which is half the well-known orm of 0.7 per 
cent mentioned by the 1969 Pearson Commission and confirmed by the Brandt Com- 
mission (1980, 1983). The 1987 DAC Report provided us with figures for all developed 
countries over the period 1970-1986. Only a few countries meet his well-known orm: 
the Scandinavian countries and The Netherlands. 
But the relevance of  the norm is doubtful. As said in section 4, a century of 'patience' 
would require annual contributions of development assistance of 60 per cent. A century 
of patience means that only for the third generation the equality of developed and 
underdeveloped countries would be reached. Does anybody believe that the citizens of 
poor countries will be that patient? At this moment they are already flooding into the 
developed countries, legally or illegally. 
A figure of about 3 per cent development assistance was already proposed long ago 
by Dr S.L. Mansholt, at that time chairman of the European Commission; by the Swiss 
churches, and by the American economist J.A. Yunker. 
If patience were to run out after 400 years (twelve generations), development 
assistance would have to be 8.1 per cent of GNP. 
This figure illustrates convincingly that even in such advanced countries as Sweden, 
world-wide income redistribution is given a much lower priority than redistribution 
within the nation. Sweden spends almost 30 per cent on internal redistribution, but only 
0.7 per cent on external redistribution. The same is true for all other countries, which 
is understandable. But global approaches have become necessary and aiming at equal 
redistribution i ternally and externally would therefore be wiser. 
7 CONCLUSION 
In an attempt to summarize this study on the optimal economic order the reader may be 
reminded that since the Soviet leaders discovered that the productivity of their economic 
system was too low, determining the optimal economic order has become one of the 
most important problems for humanity to solve. The most telling feature of any social 
order is the degree of redistribution f incomes: it is the core of both the 'social prob- 
lem' within and the problem of development cooperation among nations. 
Our attempt o solve it has produced the figure of 0.77 as the redistribution 
equilibrium to aim for. This goal can be attained by annual transfers of the rich to the 
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poor, transfers whose level depends on the time horizon chosen. Studies are needed to 
find out which time period is optimal. While in that respect he present study is in- 
complete and only a first step, some insight could be obtained from a comparison with 
empirical data about (i) redistribution within and (ii) redistribution among nations. 
Time periods may be expressed in generations (of 30 to 35 years), and prospects for at- 
taining the long-term goal in three to twelve generations. The most advanced country, 
Sweden, appears to have chosen the time span of seven to eight generations for its inter- 
nal redistribution. That requires about 30 per cent of GNP redistribution per annum. 
Japan appears to have opted for ten generations and the other developed countries show 
figures in between. 
Transfers to underdeveloped countries (version (ii)) take centuries. With the present 
level of development assistance (0.35 per cent of GNP) five centuries are needed to ob- 
tain the optimum (income quality of developed and underdeveloped nations). If that 
goal had to be attained in three generations, annual development aid would have to be 
60 per cent of GNP, if in twelve, 8.t per cent. 
Understandably, all nations how much greater internal redistribution than external. 
The question may be raised whether the pressure of immigration from underdeveloped 
countries will not force the developed countries to raise their contribution to much 
higher levels. For really forward-looking governments hat is the conclusion of this 
study. And don't the French rightly state that gouverner c'est prdvoir? 
J. Tinbergen* 
* I am greatly indebted to my colleagues Jean H.P. Paelinck, Zhaorong Wang and P.H.J.J. 
Terhal for remarks about a first version of this address, which led to fundamental changes in the 
setup of this study. 
